We analyze the determinants of debt choices for Chinese firms between bonds and syndicated loans. This issue helps appraising the weak development of bond market in China. We test if flotation costs, asymmetries of information, and renegotiation and liquidation costs, influence the choice of debt in line with former studies. We also investigate the potential role of central state ownership on debt choice, as bond market development is a central government goal, by checking if central state owned firms are more likely to issue bond. We test these hypotheses on a dataset of 220 Chinese listed firms over the period 2006-2010. We find evidence in favor of the influence of central government on the financing choices of firms it owns, as central state-owned firms are more likely to issue a bond. We also observe limited support that this influence is stronger for central state-owned firms located closer from the capital. Furthermore, we identify that these companies tend to borrow uniquely on the bond market rather than tapping both debt markets. We provide evidence in favor of the flotation costs hypothesis, but provide mixed evidence for the information asymmetry hypothesis and rather reject the renegotiation and liquidation hypothesis. All in all, our findings show the role of different factors in corporate financing choices in China as in other countries, with a key role of state ownership.
Introduction
In spite of its impressive growth, China still owns an underdeveloped financial system. Two features are of particular interest. On the one hand, the financial system is dominated by the banking industry which focuses its financing towards the state companies.
1 On the other hand, the corporate bond market remains impressively weak. In 2006, the corporate bond market provided only 1.4% of the financing needs of Chinese firms (Hale, 2007) in spite of its growth.
2
Corporate bond market development is a major issue for the Chinese financial system modernization. There is a consensus that an inefficient financial system could hamper Chinese future economic growth (Allen et al., 2009) . A well-functioning corporate bond market can provide a better allocation of capital in the economy (e.g. Herring and Chatusripitak, 2006) .
Corporate bond market plays an informational role by providing the public with market determined structure of interest rates for a particular class of risk and maturity. As Chinese banks do not behave efficiently (Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2009) , market consensus could improve the risk management for bank loans by providing benchmarks of risk pricing.
Increased competition between banks and the bond market could also put pressure on banks to attract other types of borrowers such as small and medium enterprises which are currently rationed on the credit market.
On the demand side, firms have incentives to prefer bank loans than bonds. Interest rate regulation and absence of alternative for investors allow banks to provide firms with low cost funds. As summarized by the Governor of the PBOC, "corporations with good credit standing do not have strong motivation to issue bonds as they can easily obtain loans from commercial banks at low interest rates" (BIS, 2005) .
The Chinese government seems to be aware of the importance to develop its corporate bond market (OECD, 2010) . The Governor of the People's Bank of China (PBOC) recognizes that "China's underdeveloped corporate bond market has distorted the financing structure in the economy which poses a threat to financial stability, as well as to social and economic development" (Zhou, 2005) .
1 Even if total bank credit ratios are rather high in China (between 100% and 120% of GDP over the past decade), Allen et al. (2009) observe that the size of Chinese banking industry in terms of total bank credit to non-state sectors amounted to just 31% of GDP in 2005. 2 Annual growth of the corporate bond market reached 24.13% on average during the period 1990-2006 (People's Bank of China and China Statistical Yearbooks, cited by Allen et al., 2009 ).
Our objective in this paper is to analyze the determinants of the choice for a Chinese firm to issue a bond rather than borrowing. The alternative financial instrument to a bond is mainly a syndicated loan, as a bond issuance is associated with a large amount which is more commonly provided by a syndicate of banks than by one single bank. Therefore, we focus on the choice to issue a bond rather than asking for a syndicated loan. Three theories have been provided to explain the choice between public and private debt issuance which lie on flotation costs (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988) , asymmetries of information (Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992) , and costs of debt liquidation and renegotiation (Berlin and Loeys, 1988) .
Our first contribution is to analyze the relevance of these theories to understand the choice of corporate debt in China. We then prolong two empirical works which have similarly investigated the choice of large debt financing between bond and syndicated loan based on these three theories. Esho, Lam and Sharpe (2001) perform this analysis on a sample of debt financings in Asian countries, widely dominated by financings to Japanese companies. China is included in the sample but only for 6 syndicated loans whereas no Chinese bond is considered. They test the influence of several financial variables to investigate the relevance of the three theories. They find empirical support for the three theories with notably bond issuances positively related to firm size and negatively to the probability of financial distress of the issuer. Altunbas, Kara and Marques-Ibanez (2010) focus on determinants of financing choices between corporate bond and syndicated loan markets in European countries. They also find support to the three theories of corporate financing choices. In particular, larger firms, with more financial leverage, higher fixed assets to total asset but fewer growth opportunities are more likely to borrow from the syndicated loan market rather than the corporate bond market.
However we do not restrict our analysis to the investigation of these three theories on China. Our second contribution is to take into account a key characteristic of this country: the influence of the State in the economy. Namely, several elements suggest that the choice of debt financing might be influenced by ownership of the firm. On the one hand, bond market development is an explicit policy of the government. On the other hand, central state-owned firms issue far more bonds than other types of firms.
Thus, we consider a fourth hypothesis in our analysis which is the central government influence. As the development of the corporate bond market is a central government policy goal, we expect this influence to be exercised by the central government rather than local governments because they tend to differ in objectives and motivations in managing stateowned enterprises (Chen, Firth and Xu, 2009 employ an incremental approach rather than focusing on balance sheet ratios. This allows us to identify factors related to a particular issuance type. Therefore, we study which factors increase the probability for a firm to issue a bond rather than a syndicated loan. We also examine which factors explain the choice of a firm to select only one of these markets rather than borrow on both markets during the sample period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the large debt markets in China. Section 3 reviews the determinants of financing choices. Section 4 describes data and methodology. Section 5 develops the results. Section 6 concludes.
Overview of large debt financing markets in China

The corporate bond market
The bond market still remains very small, although its annual growth was sustained at 26.9% on average during the period 1995 -2005 (OECD, 2010 . The total outstanding bonds reaches 45% of GDP by mid-2009, a comparable figure to other emerging countries, but the corporate segment accounts only for one tenth of it (corporate bonds issuances outstanding amounts including commercial paper represent 4% of GDP).
The Chinese bond market is fragmented in three bodies: the interbank market, the exchange market and the bank counter market. The main body, the interbank market, is a quote-driven over-the-counter (OTC) market in which deals are negotiated between two counterparties on the basis of bid-ask prices. It absorbs about 95% of the bond trading (OECD, 2010 
The syndicated loans market
A syndicated loan involves a group of lenders which jointly grant a loan to a single borrower. The process of syndication starts with a lead bank mandated by the borrower to design the main characteristics of the financial contract. The lead bank (or arranger) of the loan promotes the loan to other banks or financial institutions which can potentially participate to the deal. Every participant funds a part of the loan and is responsible for it. The monitoring role of the borrower usually falls to the arranger of the loan.
The syndicated loan market is an international debt market in which foreign bank participation can be very high, especially in emerging markets. In China, half of the participants have been domestic banks on the period 1999 (McCauley, Fung and Gadanecz, 2002 . Further evidence suggests that foreign banks tends to be either the only participants or totally absent in Chinese syndicated loans (Godlewski, Pessarossi and Weill, 2010 of the total lending in some developed countries according to China Banking Association.
One characteristic of syndicate structure in China was the domination of foreign banks to play the role of arranger in the loans (Gadanecz, 2004) . With less experience in the process of loan syndication, Chinese domestic banks tended to enter syndicates more often as participants. The financial crisis has reversed this fact and has strengthened the role played by 
Determinants of debt choice
Our aim is to explain the choice of debt financing for Chinese companies. We define the dependent variable as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm issues a bond and zero if it issues a syndicated loan. We consider four hypotheses for the choice of debt financing in China: flotation costs, asymmetries of information, renegotiation and liquidation costs, and influence of the central government.
The flotation costs hypothesis considers that the issuer takes into account the fixed costs associated with public issuance. As these costs can be large, public issuance is more likely to take place when firms are large and need to borrow important amounts in order to make economies of scale (Blackwell and Kidwell, 1988; Smith, 1986) . We test the flotation costs hypothesis with the variable Firm Size, defined as the log of total assets. We expect a positive impact of this variable on the probability of issuing a bond.
The information asymmetry hypothesis builds on the special role played by banks in financing the economy (Fama, 1985) . As banks act as delegated monitors, they usually are cost efficient when screening and monitoring the borrower (Diamond, 1984) . However, when information asymmetries decline between the borrower and investors, the borrower can avoid these monitoring costs by issuing debt directly on the public market (Diamond, 1991) . Thus, reputation plays a central role in the choice of debt framework as well known good or bad credit rated firms can be better off by directly taping the bond market rather relying on bank debt. Moreover, as banks can extract rents from their relationship with the borrower, private debt can distort incentives to make efforts and reduce the net present value of the investment (Rajan, 1992) . Denis and Mihov (2003) show how credit quality affects the choice of debt market and that highest credit quality borrowers choose to issue debt in the public market.
In a nutshell, the information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that firms with better reputation and higher credit quality are more likely to choose public debt. In line with Esho, 
Reputation is proxied by the ratio of long term debt to total debt (Long Term Debt).
Firms with a higher ratio have succeeded to raise long term debt in the past. Thus they should benefit from a better reputation on the market and be more likely to issue public debt.
Profitability can be a visible signal of a firm ability to repay its debt. We expect consequently the return on assets (ROA) to have a positive influence on bond issuance. Finally, we take into account growth opportunities which are proxied by the market to book ratio (Market to Book).
A higher market-to-book ratio indicates that a firm has good investment or growth opportunities. More investment opportunities enhance the possibility of asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or underinvestment (Myers, 1977) . In this view, a high marketto-book ratio could be view as a proxy for important moral hazard problems (Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam, 1999) . We predict a negative impact on bond issuance for this variable.
The renegotiation and liquidation costs hypothesis refers to the difficulty a borrower encounters when he needs to renegotiate its debt with numerous lenders. A problem of coordination can arise between lenders, which can lead to the survival of negative NPV projects or to the too early liquidation of positive NPV projects (for instance because of too lenient or harsh covenants). In contrast, a bank can determine if it is efficient to continue or liquidate prematurely a project. This happens because banks monitor more closely borrower which allow them to determine more efficiently if it is optimal to liquidate or continue the project (Berlin and Loeys, 1988, Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994) . Thus, firms with a high probability of financial distress, or with a high liquidation value project, benefit more from this special expertise. They can consider beneficial to rely on banks for their financing needs.
Liquidation value is measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets (Fixed Assets)
following Johnson (1997) and Esho, Lam and Sharpe (2001) , as a larger share of fixed assets in total assets is associated with a higher collateral value. We thus expect this ratio to have a negative impact on the probability to issue a bond.
In line with Esho, Lam and Sharpe (2001) and Altunbas, Kara and Marques-Ibanez (2010), financial distress is proxied by two variables: the ratio of total debt to total assets (Leverage), and the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (Current Ratio). More leveraged firms are associated with a greater probability to rely on syndicated loans, as the probability of financial distress increases. Reciprocally, a lower ratio of current assets to current liabilities enhances the likelihood of financial distress in the short term and thus this ratio is expected to be inversely related to a public issue.
The hypothesis of the central government influence considers that firms owned by the central government should issue more bonds than others. It is based on the fact that, as government officials pursue the policy goal of developing the bond market, they can orientate the financing choices of firms they own towards bonds. In Chinese corporate governance, committees of the Chinese Communist Party intervene in important decisions regarding listed firms (Allen and Shen, 2011) . These firm-based party committees have a great influence in supervising the operating process of listed firms. They should be more prone to follow central directives if they are closer to Beijing. Thus, central government officials should be more able to exert their influence on choice of debt on firms closer to them.
We test this hypothesis by including the variable Central State-Owned, which is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is owned by the central government. As central stateowned firms have a greater probability to choose bond, we expect a positive relation for this variable.
However the influence of the government might depend on distance. Indeed central government officials can exert a greater influence on the financing choices of the firms they own which are closer for several reasons. First, central government influence can take place through informal and frequent meetings between government officials and firm managers.
These interactions are more likely to happen with managing teams of firms located closer to the central government. Second, distance is associated with greater information asymmetries in the literature (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 2002) . As the degree of information asymmetries might be weaker between central government officials and firms closer to them, they might prefer implement first their policy preferences in these firms.
Thus, we complement our investigation of this theory by adding the variable Distance, which is defined as the distance in miles of the firm headquarters from Beijing, and the interaction term between Central State-Owned and Distance. We expect this interaction term to be negatively related to the probability to issue a bond, as the influence of the central government should be reduced with the distance.
We also include some control variables in our analysis. A dummy variable equal to one if the firm is privately-owned (Privately-Owned) is added in the model. Dummy variables for the industry of the firm and for the year of debt issuance are also included in the estimations to control for industry and year effects. Finally, we control for the economic development of the province of the firm with the average GDP growth of the province over the period (GDP Growth).
Data
We use data from Bloomberg database. This database allows us to collect information on syndicated loans and corporate bonds issued by non-financial listed Chinese firms. We by 220
firms. Bloomberg database is also used to collect financial information on these borrowers.
We match financial data of the end of the year preceding firm issuance of debt.
Information on ownership is collected on the download center of China Security Index (Allen and Shen, 2011) , this ownership information is consistent with our sample. We then use the equity ticker symbol to match the ownership information with our dataset.
We interestingly observe that ownership types are not equivalently represented in each borrower category. Namely, central state-owned companies represent a larger share of borrowers relying only on the bond market or on both markets. To say it differently, this finding suggests that central state-owned companies use more bond than syndicated loan for their financing needs. The same observation does not stand for local state-owned companies which rely more on syndicated loans or for privately-owned companies.
Firm size greatly differs across borrower categories. Firms participating to both debt markets are on average larger than those using only the syndicated loan market. More surprisingly, firms which only access the bond market are much larger than those accessing both debt markets. This finding is in sharp contrast with the observation from Altunbas, Kara 
Results
This section is devoted to the presentation of our results. We perform logit regressions with random effects to estimate the determinants of the choice of debt financing. As we have different types of firms depending on their use of syndicated loan and bond markets, we perform two sets of estimations.
First, we consider only firms which have used one debt market for a given year.
Second, we compare the financing choices of firms using one debt market relative to those which have used both debt markets.
The determinants of the choice between corporate bond and syndicated loan
We start our investigation by looking at the financing choices of firms which have only used one debt instrument for a given year. We therefore exclude here from our analysis firms which have issued a bond and a syndicated loan for the same year. We are then able to analyze the issue of a bond or a syndicated loan as a binary decision.
So our analysis here includes firms from categories 1 (issuing only syndicated loans) and 2 (issuing only bonds). However category 3 also includes firms which have issued a bond and a syndicated loan over the period but for different years. We therefore estimate two different models, depending of the inclusion of these specific firms.
The first model excludes firms issuing bonds and syndicated loans over the period. So it is restricted to firms from categories 1 and 2. The interaction effect is negative for all values of Distance and statistically different from 0 at the 1% level on the range 0 to 1000 miles. This suggests that the probability of a central-state owned firm to issue public debt decreases as distance from Beijing increases. At some point -i.e. when the central-state owned firm is very far from the central governmentdistance stop to influence the probability to prefer bond issuance rather than borrow from the syndicated loan market. Ceteris paribus, a central state-owned firm located in Beijing has a higher probability to issue a bond compared to a central-state owned firm located 200 miles away from the capital city, whereas the probability of issuing a bond for two central-state owned firms located at respectively 1200 and 1400 miles from Beijing does not change. The information asymmetry hypothesis receives little support from our estimations.
We observe a positive coefficient for Long Term Debt, which accords with the view that firms with greater reputation are more likely to issue bond. However this variable is only significant in the first specification. Furthermore, ROA and Market to Book are not significant, which is at odds with the hypothesis that profitability and growth opportunities would influence the choice of debt.
Finally, we find mixed evidence regarding the renegotiation and liquidation costs hypothesis. Liquidation value proxied by Fixed Assets is not significant, while Current Ratio which is one of both measures controlling financial distress also lacks of significance.
Nevertheless, Leverage which also measures financial distress is significantly negative as expected, which means that greater leverage reduces the ability to issue bond. This latter finding is in conformity with Esho, Lam and Sharpe (2001) and Altunbas, Kara and MarquesIbanez (2009) . This can be explained by the fact that the benefits of an optimal renegotiation with few lenders increase with financial distress. It reflects the ability and skills of banks to achieve a better renegotiation as in other countries. It might also be a consequence of political connections between banks and borrowers which allow them to easily obtain favorable debt renegotiations in case of financial distress that they cannot achieve with the market.
We now turn to the second model in which we also consider firms which have issued bond and syndicated loan over the period but on different years. We thus extend our sample considerably. We do not however take all firms into account as those from category 3 which have issued a bond and a syndicated loan for the same year are still excluded. The estimations of this model are displayed in Table 3 . As above, we adopt two specifications, depending on the inclusion of distance and of the interaction term between distance and central-state Assets and Current Ratio. The only slight exception concerns the information asymmetry hypothesis which is now totally contradicted by the findings. Namely, among the three variables used to test this hypothesis the only one significant above, the ratio of long-term debt to total debt becomes now not significant in both specifications.
In a nutshell, our estimations have shown that central state-owned firms have a greater probability to issue a bond rather than a syndicated loan. We find limited evidence on the role of distance from the capital to weaken this ownership influence. Finally, we find limited support for the three traditional hypotheses on the choice of debt financing of Chinese companies.
The determinants of the choice between one and two debt instruments
Until now we have only considered firms issuing one debt instrument for a given year.
We now extend the investigation by analyzing the determinants of the choice to use two debt instruments rather than only one. We include firms using both debt instruments for a given year in our sample. We want to study the factors influencing the joint use of debt instruments.
Our aim is to identify the factors increasing the probability of a company to prefer borrowing exclusively from the corporate bond market rather than taping both debt markets, and those enhancing the probability to borrow only from the syndicated loan market rather than both debt markets. One way to conduct this analysis is to set two binomials logit models 5
These estimations are of utmost interest for our analysis. Indeed, up to this point, one could argue that influence does not come from the central government to central state-owned companies but from these companies to the central government. As issuing a corporate bond in China remains tightly regulated, central state-owned companies could benefit from their connections with central government officials to easily obtain the right to issue bonds (Beg and Gray, 1984) . Thus, we now estimate two new specifications which differ from the former one for the dependent variable. The first model explains a dependent variable equal to one if the firm issues a syndicated loan and a bond on the sample period, and zero if the firm issues only a bond. The second model explains a dependent variable equal to one if the firm issues a syndicated loan and a bond on the sample period, and zero if the firm issues only a syndicated loan. The results of these estimations are reported in Table 4 . 6 . By comparing firms borrowing only in the corporate bond market to those which borrow from both debt markets, we empirically address this question. Accessing to both markets indicates that a firm does not suffer from discrimination in entering the corporate bond market. Thus, if central state-owned companies prefer to issue debt only in the corporate bond market, this should reflect influence coming from the central government towards them.
The first model shows a significantly negative coefficient for Central-State Owned, i.e.
central state-owned companies have a higher probability to rely only on the corporate bond market than to borrow on both debt markets. Reciprocally, the second model leads to the conclusion that these companies prefer accessing both debt markets rather than only the syndicated loan market. Central state-owned companies appear then to neglect the syndicated loan market and rely mostly uniquely on the corporate bond market. Thus, these results are in favor of the will of central government to secure the corporate bond market development through issuances of firms' debts it controls directly.
We again find evidence of an interaction between physical distance and central state ownership of firms. Graphs 3 and 4 in Appendix B report the interaction effect between
Distance and Central State-Owned around confidence intervals of 1% and 10% respectively for the model in column 1 and 2. The farer a central state-owned firm is from the central government, the more likely it is to issue debt in both markets rather only in the bond market.
Symmetrically, a central state-owned firm farer from Beijing has an increased probability to rely only on the syndicated loan market rather than both debt markets. We thus find further evidence that distance from the central government might play a role in debt choices in China.
As a consequence, the findings of these models comparing the use of one debt instrument relative to the joint use of both debt instruments confirm the influence of central state-ownership on financing choices of Chinese listed firms.
In both models, only few variables are significant. It is of interest to observe that firm size favors the use of both debt markets rather than relying only on the syndicated loan market, which is in line again with the flotation costs hypothesis. We do not however point out some role of firm size on the choice of using only bond rather than both debt instruments.
Furthermore, a greater ratio of long-term debt to total debt influences positively the choice of borrowing on both debt markets in both specifications. All in all, this might indicate that reputation is not absolutely neutral for a firm in accessing debt markets.
We also point out that firms with greater leverage prefer to borrow from both markets rather only in the bond market. It suggests that a preference remains-at least partly -for carrying bank debt when the probability of financial distress is higher. Finally, we observe that a greater current ratio favors the use of both debt markets relative to each type of debt.
Conclusion
The development of bond markets remains impressively weak in China in spite of its recent expansion. To help explaining this feature, we have provided new evidence by analyzing the determinants of the choice between bond and syndicated loan for large financing needs of companies.
Our main finding is the role of the central government on the financing choices of firms it owns. Namely, central state-owned firms are more likely to issue a bond than a syndicated loan in comparison to either local state-owned or privately-owned companies.
Furthermore, we find limited support in favor of the fact that this influence is stronger for central state-owned firms located closer from the central government, which is in line with the view of greater information asymmetries between central government officials and firm managers with the distance. We also identify that central state-owned companies tend to borrow uniquely on the bond market rather than tapping both debt markets. This influence accords with the official policy goal for the development of the bond market.
We provide evidence in favor of the flotation costs hypothesis, as larger firms tend to prefer bond issuance than borrowing on the syndicated loan market. Nevertheless, our findings provide mixed evidence in favor of the information asymmetry hypothesis and rather contradict the renegotiation and liquidation hypothesis. These latter results are in opposition with those observed in the studies from Esho, Lam and Sharpe (2001) Thus, the interaction effect is equal to:
where ( ) is the logistic cumulative distribution function with The asymptotic variance of the interaction effect is estimated consistently by the following formula:
where Ω � is a consistent covariance matrix estimator of the vector parameters estimates ̂. Table 1 .
Descriptive statistics
The Table 2 . Model 1: Borrowers using only one debt instrument over the period Logit regressions with random effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the used instrument is bond, and zero if the used instrument is syndicated loan. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1 . This table reports coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industry and year are included in the regressions, but not reported.
Regressions Explanatory variables
(1) Table 3 . Model 2: Borrowers using only one debt instrument for a given year Logit regressions with random effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the used instrument is bond, and zero otherwise. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1 . This table reports coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industry and year are included in the regressions, but not reported.
(1) Table 4 . Model 3: the choice between one debt instrument and both types of debt instruments Logit regressions with random effects. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has used bond and syndicated loan during the period, and to zero if the firm has only used respectively bonds for the first estimation and syndicated loans for the second estimation over the period. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1 . This table reports coefficients with standard errors in brackets. *, ** and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for industry and year are included in the regressions, but not reported.
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